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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of corruption on public and private investment in African
countries as a way of exploring one channel through which corruption undermines growth. The
empirical results indicate that corruption affects economic growth directly and through its
impact on investment. We find that corruption has a negative and significant effect on domestic
investment and that corruption affects public and private investment differently. The results
indicate that corruption has a positive effect on public investment while it has a negative effect
on private investment. The positive association between public investment and corruption
supports the view that corrupt bureaucrats seek to increase capital expenditure (over
maintenance expenditures) to maximize private gains (rent-seeking). In contrast, the results
confirm that corruption discourages private investment, suggesting that corruption increases the
costs of doing business while raising uncertainty over expected returns to capital. The results
support the view that corruption hampers growth and call for institutional reforms to improve
the quality of governance as a prerequisite for achieving investment-led growth.
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1. Introduction

The empirical literature has provided substantial evidence of the negative impact of corruption
on economic activity, both at the macroeconomic level as well as the microeconomic level. At
the macroeconomic level, corruption has been shown to have negative effects on per capita
GDP level and growth (Mauro 1995; Ades and Di Tella 1997; Lambsdorff 2003). At the
microeconomic level, evidence shows that corruption is associated with lower efficiency in the
allocation and use of production factors (Dal Bó and Rossi 2007).

The literature has advanced several explanations of the links between corruption and growth.
This study focuses on one particular channel through which corruption undermines growth,
namely domestic investment. The paper posits that corruption discourages private investment
by raising indirect production costs (corruption is a “tax” on investment) and by increasing
uncertainty over future returns to capital. Moreover, corruption adversely affects the quantity of
productive public investment by displacing public funds from public investment towards
unproductive activities. We further argue that corruption also has a negative effect on the
efficiency of public investment as corrupt officials give priority to projects that generate higher
private material and political gains over projects with higher social returns (higher impact on
the economy). These efficiency effects are difficult to test empirically with aggregated data, but
they are nonetheless critical for the linkages between corruption and growth. This bias in the
allocation of public funds in favor of large rent-generating projects implies that corruption may
lead to higher (though inefficient), not lower, public investment.

In this paper we study the impact of corruption on public and private investment in African
countries as a way of exploring one channel through which corruption undermines growth. We
examine empirically these effects using a sample of 33 African countries (see Appendix A)
over the period 1982-2001. We use various specifications to explore the robustness of the
results. We especially carefully examine the time series characteristics of the data (in a paneldata setting) and control for possible endogeneity biases due to the nature of some of the
regressorsusing the GMM estimation technique.

The empirical results indicate that corruption affects income directly and through its impact on
investment. However, we find that corruption affects private investment and public investment
differently. We find that corruption affects private investment negatively, while it is positively
related to public investment, suggesting that a corrupt government tends to allocate resources to
large public investment infrastructure to maximize opportunities for embezzlement of public
resources. The results imply that the rent-seeking bias in the allocation of public expenditures
results in higher, though inefficient, public investment in economies characterized by high
levels of corruption.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature
on the links between corruption, growth, and investment. In Section 3, we describe the data and
the estimation methodology. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 concludes
with a summary of the findings.
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2. Corruption, growth, and investment: A literature review

Corruption is often understood as the abuse of public office for private gains, whether material
or political. According to sociologists, corruption is a symptom of dysfunctionality of the
relationship between the state and the people, characterized by bribery, extortion and nepotism
(Alatas 1968: 11). As a result of corruption, the public at large loses confidence in the
government’s ability to manage the economy in the interest of the people.

Given that corruption not only brings benefits to those in control of power, but also allows the
latter to manipulate the institutions to their advantage, the consequences is that corruption has a
tendency to be self-perpetuating. Thus, once a system is corrupt, it is likely to remain corrupt
and become even more corrupt unless drastic reforms are undertaken to eradicate the
phenomenon.

The literature has identified several vehicles of corruption, which should not be understood as
causes of corruption. These include concentration of power, discretion in public spending, the
structure of the tax system, low relative wages in the public sector, temptation for
embezzlement of fungible external debt and development aid, and lack of transparency in
international contracts especially in natural resource extraction (see Ndikumana 2007). In this
study, we emphasize the role of discretion and distortion in public spending.
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As Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) point out, corruption is by and large a byproduct of
government interventions. It is especially made possible by the discretion that the policy
makers enjoy in determining the type, size, composition and geographical location of projects
and service delivery.1 The level of discretion is generally higher for capital expenditures than
recurrent expenditures (Mauro 1998). For example, while governments can manipulate,
misinvoice, and embezzle funding for road construction projects (capital expenditures), it is
more difficult to embezzle civil servant salaries (recurrent expenditures).

The foregoing analysis has important implications for the linkages between corruption and
public investment. It suggests that corruption will be associated with higher public expenditure
on infrastructure as decision makers seek to maximize their private gains by giving preference
to large new investment projects over maintenance expenditures. This suggests that high public
investment is not necessarily a desirable outcome in an environment characterized by
corruption as it will result in wasteful allocation of public resources.

There is wide support in the literature for the view that corruption is detrimental to growth
(Tanzi 2002; Svensson 2005; Gyimah-Brempong 2002). Empirical evidence shows that
countries with higher levels of corruption tend to grow more slowly. This finding is particularly
relevant for developing countries in general, and African countries in particular for two
reasons. First, governance standards are generally lower in developing countries compared to
industrialized countries, and they are worse in African countries compared to countries in other
1

Discretion also increases possibilities of embezzlement, causing leakages in the transmission of public resources
from the central decision point to the ultimate users of public services (see Reinikka and Svensson 2005 for
illustrations on the case of Uganda).
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developing regions (see Ndikumana 2007). Second, sub-Saharan Africa also performs poorly in
terms of growth relative to other regions (UNECA, 2008). These two stylized facts suggest the
possibility that bad governance in general and corruption in particular may be one of the
reasons for the poor economic performance in African countries.

In addition to reducing growth, corruption is also found to have substantial distributional
effects as it affects the poor disproportionately. This is because corruption slows down the
growth of the income of the poor, reduces pro-poor public expenditures, causes congestion in
social services, and induces capital intensity in production, which reduces the employment
impact of investment and growth (Ndikumana 2007).

One important empirical question that remains unsettled is how exactly corruption reduces
growth. In other words, what are the channels through which corruption undermines growth?
The literature has identified a number of channels that appear to be empirically more prominent
in linking corruption to growth. These include investment (public and private), tax revenue,
human capital accumulation and labor productivity, and political instability. Ndikumana (2007)
provides a detailed discussion of these linkages and their implications for pro-poor growth. The
present study focuses on the investment channels of the linkages between corruption and
growth.

According to the literature, corruption discourages investment – both domestic investment and
foreign direct investment – because the various forms of takings (bribes, kickbacks, etc.) and
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transactions costs due to corruption (delays, distortions, etc.) increase uncertainty over the
returns to capital and raise the cost of production, which ultimately reduces profitability (Mauro
1995, Tanzi and Davoodi 2002a). Corruption acts as a tax on capital; but unlike official tax, it
is uncertain and unpredictable, and therefore difficult to internalize. Given that corruption tends
to perpetuate itself, this makes the option of delaying investment less attractive. This induces
potential investors to prefer activities with shorter maturity such as trade and speculative
ventures over long-term investment.

The empirical literature has documented that the effects of corruption on investment are
quantitatively large. For example, according to Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), a one standard
deviation decrease in the corruption index raises private investment by as much as 2.5
percentage points. This in turn leads to an increase in GDP growth by about 0.34 percentage
points (see also Mauro 1995). Mauro (1998) argues that the bulk of the effects of corruption on
growth operate through private investment, accounting for about one third of total growth
effects.

Corruption also reduces growth by adversely affecting the quantity as well as the quality of
public investment. Corruption erodes efficiency in decisions regarding public investment,
especially by inducing preference for large projects with potential for large private gains for the
policy makers. Indeed, data tend to support this prediction of a positive correlation between
public expenditure and corruption (Figure 1; see also Ndikumana 2007). Firm-level data show
that corruption is associated with lower efficiency. Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) find that public
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electricity distribution companies are less efficient – use more labor for a given level of output
– in countries with high level of corruption. Thus, corruption is likely to be associated with
higher but less efficient public investment.

In addition, corruption causes a bias in favor of new projects to the detriment of maintenance
expenditures (Mauro 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002b). The preference for new projects is
motivated by the pursuit of higher takings and is also supported by the old “golden rule” that
requires governments to finance recurrent expenditures by current revenue whereas capital
expenditures can be financed by borrowing. These rent-seeking and golden-rule incentives
generate a positive correlation between corruption and the quantity of public investment and a
negative correlation between corruption and the quality of public investment. These
relationships have important implications for the linkages between growth and public
investment. As more resources are allocated to wasteful public investment, it is perfectly
possible for higher public investment to be associated with lower growth. This is an empirical
question that deserves further investigation.
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Figure 1: Corruption and capital expenditures
(n = 90 countries)
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Source: The corruption index is from International Country Risk Guide; capital
expenditure/gdp ratios are from World Development Indicators.

This study aims at exploring these investment channels of the effects of corruption on growth
in the context of African countries. In addition to the strong empirical evidence on the linkages
between growth and investment on the one hand and investment and corruption on the other,
the paper is motivated by the evidence of higher corruption and lower growth in African
countries relative to other regions. The analysis in the paper may shed light on policies aimed at
promoting growth by encouraging domestic investment in African countries.

3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data
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This study uses unbalanced panel data from 33 African countries for the period 1982-2001. The
countries are selected on the basis of data availability. The main endogenous variables included
in the estimation are income per-capita (in log form), domestic investment (public, private,
total) as a percentage of GDP, openness (the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of
GDP, in log), total reserves (in log), a measure of financial development, proxied by credit to
the private sector as a percentage of GDP (in log), and adult literacy rates (in log) as a measure
of human capital. Data on these variables are from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators and the World Bank Africa Database.

Our measure of corruption is the corruption index from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) database. This variable measures corruption in government and is measured on a scale
of 0-6 with lower scores indicating higher corruption, where “high government officials are
likely to demand special payments” and that “illegal payments are generally expected
throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes connected with import and
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans” (excerpts from
ICRG). In the empirical analysis, the corruption index is rescaled by subtracting the ICRG value
from 6 (the maximum value), so that high values indicate high corruption for ease of
interpretation of the regression results.

In addition, the analysis controls for other determinants of investment including total reserves
and real exchange rate variability (defined as the absolute value of the annual deviation in the
real exchange rate index from a time trend) to proxy for macroeconomic instability. The effect
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of exchange rate instability on economic growth has been stressed in other studies (Bleaney and
Greenaway 2001; Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana 2007), and is of particular relevance to
African countries. For example, Baliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana (2007) argue that “ [t]he
narrow export base has exposed African countries to the vagaries of international markets,
resulting in high volatility of export proceeds and exchange rate instability.”

3.2 The empirical model
First, we examine the direct effects of corruption on growth by estimating the following model:

Yit = αYi ,t −1 + βX it + γZ it + ν i + ε it

(1)

where for a country i at time t, Y is the natural logarithm of per-capita real income, X is a
vector of predetermined and endogenous variables (including corruption, investment, openness
to trade, and others), Z is a vector of exogenous variables, and α, β, and γ are parameters to be
estimated. The estimation results are reported in Table 1.

Second, we explore the effects of corruption on investment by estimating three sets of
investment equations: domestic investment, private investment, and public investment. We
specify the following investment equation:

Invit = ∂Invi ,t −1 + ρX it + λZ it + ν i + ε it

(2)

where Inv is investment, X is a vector of predetermined and endogenous variables (including
per-capita real income, corruption, institutional quality, openness to trade, and others), and Z is
a vector of exogenous variables. The estimation results are reported in Tables 2-4.
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In all estimations, we assume that νi and εit are independent over all time periods and for each
country i. The term νi represents country-specific effects that are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed over the countries, and εit is also independent and identically
distributed. We estimate the model using Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). We report relevant statistics for the tests for
autocorrelation and the validity of instruments (Sargan test) along with the coefficient estimates
in Tables 1-4.

4. Discussion of empirical results

Table 1 reports the estimation results for growth equations. Columns (1) and (2) show the
results when we include total investment as a percentage of GDP. In both equations, investment
has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, and macroeconomic instability (proxied
real exchange rate variability) has, as expected, a negative and statistically significant
coefficient. The results indicate that openness to trade, corruption, and human capital (proxied
by literacy rates) are statistically insignificant. In addition, the indicator of financial
development is statistically significant but has a negative coefficient. Baliamoune-Lutz and
Ndikumana (2007) also find a similar counterintuitive result, which is most likely a correlation
result rather than indicating any causality, as many high-growth countries (mostly resource-rich
countries and few non-resource rich countries like Ethiopia) have low level of financial
development.
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In column (2) of Table 1 we explore the joint effect of corruption and openness by including the
interaction between corruption and openness and between corruption and the square of
openness. The results indicate that the there is an inverted-U shape effect, implying that
corruption is more harmful to growth at high levels of openness to trade. This suggests that
high-trade African countries, consisting mostly of resource-rich countries, may be more prone
to corruption.

In column (3) of Table 1 we distinguish between private investment and public investment. The
results indicate that contrary to our expectations, private investment has a negative coefficient
but it is statistically insignificant.2 On the other hand, the coefficient on public investment is
positive and significant.

In Table 2 we report estimation results for total domestic investment. In all four columns
income has a robust positive effect, implying that richer countries have higher investment ratios.
Openness to international trade has, in general, a positive effect on investment. Corruption is
shown to have negative effects on investment but only once we control for the joint effect of
openness to trade and corruption. This joint effect has an inverted-U shape. As pointed out
earlier, perhaps this result suggests that high-trade African countries, most of which are
resource-rich, may be more prone to corruption. Exchange rate volatility has a negative and
significant effect on investment, consistent with our prediction that macroeconomic instability
discourages investment.
2

Including public investment and private investment in separate equations produced similar results. The
results are not reported here but they may be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Table 3 shows the regression results for the private investment equation. Corruption has a
negative and significant effect on private investment while openness has a positive and
statistically significant effect. As expected, the proxy for economic instability (exchange rate
variability) has negative and significant coefficient. In column 2 we also include a proxy for
institutional quality, namely the polity 2 index from the Polity IV project, measured on a –10 to
+10 scale, with higher values indicating better institutions. This variable has a statistically
insignificant coefficient.

Contrary to expectation, income has a negative and significant effect on private investment.
This result suggests that increases in income in this sample of countries have not been translated
into higher private investment. This may illustrate the fact that growth in many SSA countries
has been volatile and driven by the resource sector (oil and minerals) and that governments have
failed to establish mechanisms to channel export revenues to expand new activities in nonresource sectors. This interpretation is consistent with the findings in other studies that
document a negative association between foreign exchange reserves and total investment (see,
among others, Elhiraika and Ndikumana 2007).

The estimation results for public investment equations are reported in Table 4. Income seems to
have a positive effect on public investment. Interestingly, the coefficient on corruption is
positive, suggesting that corrupt governments tend to allocate resources to large public
investment infrastructure projects with more opportunities for private gains. This results in
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wasteful investments in unproductive and poorly designed projects, which will not be
maintained. Recall that the results in Table 1 showed that public investment has a positive
effect on income. These two sets of results are not inconsistent in the case of African countries.
The results suggest that high income countries tend to have large public sectors, as a result of
large infrastructure investments. To the extent that these infrastructure investments are
motivated by corruption (as implied by the results in Table 3) it will be difficult for countries to
sustain the projects, leading to early decay of the infrastructure. This in turn will make growth
unsustainable. Indeed, a perennial feature of African economies has been high volatility of
growth over the past decades (UNECA 2008).

Given that recently many African countries have accumulated massive amounts of reserves due
to high exports of oil and minerals, it is worth exploring the effects of reserves on public
investment. The empirical results indicate that accumulation of reserves is negatively related to
public investment, suggesting that governments have not used these revenues to increase public
investment (see also Elhiraika and Ndikumana 2007). This result implies that the growth effects
of the resource boom will not be sustained if African countries fail to take advantage of higher
revenues to increase domestic investment.

4. Conclusion

Consistent with the evidence in the empirical literature, the analysis in this paper has established
a statistically significant effect of investment on growth in a sample of 33 African countries.
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The evidence confirms that investment constitutes a key driver for growth. In addition, the
analysis provides evidence of a negative effect of corruption on domestic investment,
suggesting that one of the channels through which corruption affects growth is through
investment. One interesting result is that corruption affects private investment and public
investment differently. While corruption has a negative impact on private investment, the results
indicate a positive relationship between public investment and corruption. The negative effect
of corruption on private investment is due to the uncertainty as well as production and
transactions costs arising from corruption. Thus, in this sample of African countries, the results
do not support the view that corruption serves as a “grease for the wheel” of private economic
activity, but rather as a tax that private investors cannot fully internalize.

The observed positive relation between public investment and corruption is indicative of rentseeking and golden-rule effects. However, it is puzzling that at the same time, public investment
is positively related to income. One possible interpretation is that countries with high income
also have large public sectors, or that the public sector expands as income increases. However,
even if this were the case, to the extent that the negative efficiency effects of corruption on
public investment are substantial, then public investment would generate minimal gains in terms
of long-term growth. Thus, to achieve and sustain high growth rates it is necessary to increase
not only the quantity of public investment but also its quality, which in turn will require
aggressive measures to reduce corruption.

14

References
Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier, 2000. “The choice between market failure and corruption.”
American Economic Review 90 (March), 194-211.
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella, 1997. “National champions and corruption: some unpleasant
interventionist arithmetic.” Economic Journal 107 (443), 1023-1042.
Alatas, S. H., 1968. The Sociology of Corruption: The Nature, Function, Causes and
Prevention of Corruption. Singapore: Hoong Fatt Press.
Arellano M., S. Bond, 1991. “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.” The Review of Economic
Studies 58, 277-97.
Baliamoune-Lutz, M. and L. Ndikumana, 2007. “The Growth Effects of Openness to Trade and
the Role of Institutions: New Evidence from African Countries.” Policy Discussion
Paper no. 6, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University.
Bleaney M. and D. Greenaway, 2001. “The Impact of Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate
Volatility on Investment and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of Development
Economics 65 (2), 491-500.
Dal Bó, E. and M.A. Rossi, 2007. “Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from
electric utilities.” Journal of Public Economics 91, 939-962.
Elhiraika, A. and L. Ndikumana, 2007. “Reserves Accumulation in African Countries: Sources,
Motivations, and Effects.” Mimeo, UNECA.
Gyimah-Brempong, Kwabena, 2002. “Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in
Africa.” Economics of Governance, 3: 183-209.
Lambsdorff, J., 2003. “How corruption affects productivity.” Kyklos 56 (4), 457-474.
Mauro, P., 1995. “Corruption and growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (3), 681-712.
Mauro, P., 1998. “Corruption and the composition of government expenditure.” Journal of
Public Economics 69: 263-279.
Ndikumana, L., 2007. “Corruption and Pro-Poor Growth Outcomes: Evidence and Lessons for
African Countries.” in Governance and Pro-Poor Growth, African Economic Research
Consortium, Nairobi, Kenya, 184-216 .
Pellegrini, L. and R. Gerlagh, 2004. “Corruption’s effect on growth and its transmission
channels.” Kyklos 57 (3), 429-456.
Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson, 2005. “Fighting corruption to improve schooling: evidence from
a newspaper campaign in Uganda.” Journal of European Economic Association 3 (2-3):
259-267.
Svensson, J., 2005. “Eight questions about corruption.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19
(3), 19-42.
Tanzi, V., 2002. “Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures.” In
G.T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds., Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance.
Washington, DC: IMF, 19-58.

15

Tanzi, V. and H.R. Davoodi, 2002a. “Corruption, growth, and public finances.” In G.T. Abed
and S. Gupta, eds., Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. Washington,
DC: IMF, 197-222.
Tanzi, V. and H.R. Davoodi, 2002b. “Corruption, public investment, and growth.” In G.T.
Abed and S. Gupta, eds., Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance.
Washington, DC: IMF, 280-299.
UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), 2008. Economic Report on
Africa 2008. UNECA, Addis Ababa.
World Bank, 2005. World Development Indicators 2005. CDROM edition.

16

Appendix A
List of countries
Algeria
Angola
Burkina Faso
Botswana
Cameroon
Democratic Rep. of Congo
Cote d’Ivoire
Congo, Rep.
Egypt

Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea Bissau
Guinea
Kenya
Madagascar

Mali
Malawi
Morocco
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
South Africa
Senegal
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Sierra Leone
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Table 1. Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation: Income equation
Income (lagged)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.7887***
(0.030)

0.7842***
(0.033)

0.7421***
(0.037)

0.0349**
(0.014)

0.0475***
(0.014)

Endogenous variables
Investment (total)
Private investment
Public investment
Openness
Corruption
Financial Development

0.0114
(0.017)
0.0045
(0.005)
-0.0169*
(0.008)

Corruption x Openness
Corruption x Openness
squared
Literacy
Exogenous variables
Exchange rate
instability

-0.0629
(0.043)
-0.1866
(0.083)
-0.0173*
(0.009)
0.0867**
(0.014)
-0.0094*
(0.005)

-0.0016
(0.001)
0.0028**
(0.001)
0.0101
(0.018)
-0.0015
(0.005)
-0.0194**
(0.009)

-0.0414
(0.063)
-0.0151***
(0.004)

-0.0157***
(0.004)

-0.0119***
(0.004)

0.0079***
(0.002)

0.0101***
(0.002)

0.0086***
(0.002)

Number of obs.

417
611.12 [0.99]

378
485.56 [0.99]

383
544.07 [0.99]

M2b, z ; [pr > z]

1.31 [0.19]

-0.35 [0.73]

1.35 [0.18]

Constant

Sargan testa, chi2
[prob>chi2]

Notes: The dependent variable is log of per-capita income.
a
b

Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid)
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.
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Table 2. Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation: Total domestic investment equation
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.3155***
(0.036)

0.3224***
(0.036)

0.3145***
(0.036)

0.3197***
(0.037)

0.2277***
(0.0799)
0.4385***
(0.047)
-0.0018
(0.014)

0.2769***
(0.088)
0.4346***
(0.048)
-0.0017
(0.014)

0.2304***
(0.080)
0.3538***
(0.0123)
-0.5171**
(0.249)
-0.0096
(0.025))
0.2360**
(0.118)
-0.0266*
(0.015)

0.1928**
(0.083)
0.1553
(0.112)
-0.855***
(0.234)
0.3596***
(0.114)
-0.0360**
(0.015)

-0.0136
(0.012)

-0.0254**
(0.011)

0.0088***
(0.010)

-0.0173
(0.011)
-0.0031
(0.003)
-0.0019
(0.001)
-0.0006
(0.005)
0.0154***
(0.012)

0.0056
(0.007)

0.0194
(0.009)

Number of obs.

420
517.83 [0.99]

418
513.30 [0.99]

414
528.12 [0.99]

448
560.26 [0.99]

M2b, z ; [pr > z]

1.30 [0.19]

1.15 [0.25]

1.08 [0.28]

0.77 [0.44]

Investment (lagged)
Endogenous variables
Income
Openness
Corruption
Financial development
Corruption x Openness
Corruption x Openness
squared
Exogenous variables
Exchange rate
instability
Financial development

-0.0148
(0.011)
-0.0048*
(0.003)

Total Reserves
Landlocked
Constant

Sargan testa, chi2
[prob>chi2]

-0.0028**
(0.001)

Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of total investment to GDP, in log.
a
b

Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid)
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.
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Table 3. Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation: Private investment equation
(1)

(2)

Private investment
(lagged)
Endogenous variables

0.5214***
(0.045)

0.5157***
(0.045)

Income

-4.2127***
(1.449)
3.7830***
(0.860)
-0.5060**
(0.251)

-3.9617***
(1.527)
3.7199***
(0.949)
-0.5310**
(0.219)
0.0524
(0.0539)

-0.4019**
(0.107)

-0.5287**
(0.219)

0.3429***
(0.115)

0.3652***
(0.115)

Number of obs.

412
403.62 [0.52]

412
376.86 [0.17]

M2b, z ; [pr > z]

0.88 [0.38]

0.85 [0.39]

Openness
Corruption
Polity
Exogenous variables
Exchange rate
instability
Constant

Sargan testa, chi2
[prob>chi2]

Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of private investment to GDP, in log.
a
b

Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid)
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.
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Table 4. Arellano-Bond GMM Estimation: Public investment equation
public investment (lagged)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.5868***
(0.034)

0.5858***
(0.034)

0.5851***
(0.035)

2.7846***
(1.040)
2.7463***
(0.568)
0.3599**
(0.167)

2.8079***
(1.050)
2.0877***
(0.564)
0.3609**
(0.167)

2.7816***
(1.015)
2.8925***
(0.579)
0.3427**
(0.169)

-0.0264*
(0.013)

-0.0272*
(0.014)
-0.0270
(0.119)

-0.0275*
(0.014)
-0.0339
(0.119)

-0.0260
(0.076)

-0.0104
(0.109)

-0.0017
(0.110)

387
438.62 [0.13]

387
438.42 [0.13]

387
437.75 [0.81]

Endogenous variables
Income
Openness
Corruption
Exogenous variables
Reserves
Exchange rate instability
Constant
Number of obs.

Sargan testa, chi2
[prob>chi2]

-0.34 [0.73]
-0.34 [0.73]
-0.38 [0.71]
M2b, z ; [pr > z]
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of public investment to GDP, in log.
a
b

Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Null: Instruments are valid)
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.
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